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ABSTRACT 
This paper distinguishes two approaches to the economic evaluation 
of the benefits of population control, the simple cost-benefit approach and 
the approach through macroeconomic models incorporating the population variable. 
While indicating some advantages of the second approach, it is suggested that 
the two approaches have some important common elements and some of the same 
important limitations. Various criticisms are categorised and reviewed. It 
is concluded that economists know much less than they think they know about 
the rate of return on population control expenditures, and that not too much 
weight or generality can be attached to the rather precise estimates made of 
the costs and benefits of a prevented birth. 
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WHAT DO ECONOMISTS REALLY KNOW ABOUT POPULATION? OR, THE BENEFITS OF COST-BENEFIT 
This paper distinguishes two approaches to economic evaluation of 
the benefits of population control, the simple cost-benefit approach and the 
approach through macroeconomic models incorporating the population variable. 
While indicating some advantages of the second approach, it is suggested that 
the two approaches have some important common elements and some of the same 
important limitations. Accordingly it is suggested that economists know much 
less than they think they know about the rate of return on population control 
expenditures, and that not too much weight or generality can be attached to 
the rather precise estimates made of the costs and benefits of a prevented 
birth. Since Kenya is about to embark on a significant programme of expenditure 
on family planning and population control, and the population problem in Kenya 
is the subject of a lively current debate, it seems useful to examine in some 
detail the analytical basis of these general approaches to population economics. 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: THE VALUE OF A PREVENTED BIRTH 
The pioneer in the application of cost-benefit analysis to popula-
tion control has been Stephen Enke. (See 3, 4 and 7°) He has recently 
admitted to the existence of weaknesses and simplifications in his earlier 
work, and claims these are corrected in his later formulations. However it 
will be useful to examine his early work as a guide to the usefulness and 
limitations of the general approach, and also because some elements of the 
earlier formulations remain in Enke's work and that of the other modern 
population macro-model makers. 
In his 1966 article he starts by pointing out that if we wish to 
maximise the value of output per head, V/P, we may choose between investments 
which increase V and investments which reduce P. Suppose a net investment 
of $0.5 million were made each year in industrial plants, amounting to a total 
investment of $5 million over a 10 year period. If the rate of return were, 
say, 15 per cent, yielding an increase in the value of output each year of 
$0,5x0,15 = 0.075 million, the increase in the level of annual output at the 
end of ten years would be Av = $ 0{'l*b million. If the initial output level V 
was $500 million, then the proportionate increase in annual output would be 
Av = 0.75 = 0,0015 
V 500 
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This may be compared with the same investment of $0.5 million per annum in a 
family planning programme for the insertion of intra-uterine devices (I.U.Dis). 
Enke estimates the cost of one I.U.D. insertion at $1, so that the investment 
covers 500,000 participants each year for 10 years. If the live births 
fertility per participant is 0.15 infants per annum (150 per 1000 participants), 
then the downward change in population over 10 years resulting from the 
programme would be 
AP = 0.5 x 10 x 0.15 = 0.75 million. 
Suppose the initial population were 5 million (and income per head thus equal 
to $100 to begin with). The proportionate change in population AP/P would 
be 0.15. Enke is therefore able to calculate what he calls the 'superior 
effectiveness ratio' of birth reduction over output expansion as: 
Al_/ Av = vAP = 0.15 = 100 
P / V PAv 0.0015 
implying that it is 100 times as effective to reduce population by investing 
in family planning programmes as to invest in industrial plants.' 
This ratio, he says, will vary depending on the fertility rates 
assumed for women entering the programme, f, the rates of return for industrial 
investment, r, and the servicing cost per participant. He provides a table, 
however, to indicate the sensitivity of his results to different values of f 
and r: 
Table 1. Superior - effectiveness ratios for different f and r. 
,Y 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
0.20 50 75 100 125 
0.15 67 100 133 167 
0.10 100 150 200 250 
The ratios range from a minimum of 50 up to 250. Doubling the cost per 
participant would halve the figures, still leaving a range from 25 to 125. 
The superior - effectiveness ratio is essentially a rule - of -
thumb, which nevertheless brings out some important aspects of the Enke 
approach. The basic underlying assumption is that the decrease in population, 
AP, has no effect on output, that is, does not affect Av : the return from 
the population programme is measured by the effect on income per head of 
removing heads. This is possible only because the persons eliminated are, 
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for their first 15 years, only children, with no contribution to output: their 
later productivity as adults is not counted, because the application of a rate 
of discount is enough to reduce their discounted value for the period concerned 
to zero. We shall suggest later that it is not satisfactory to dismiss the 
long run in population economics in such a simple manner. But, secondly, if 
the application of a rate of discount is so crucial to the analysis, it is 
also unsatisfactory for it to appear in this disguised form: we need to make 
it explicit within systematic cost- benefit analysis. Finally the assumption 
of an infinitely elastic supply of candidates for I.U.D.s at $ 1 per time is 
also questionable. Again we shall discuss presently the great uncertainty 
which exists regarding the response factor - the extent and nature of the 
response to family planning programmes - and the doubt therefore surrounding 
any estimates of the cost of preventing a birth in a particular country. In 
his early cost-benefit articles Enke takes the benefits to be the sum of the 
amounts the prevented birth would have consumed during his or her lifetime, 
and the costs as the sum of contributions to national output which the person 
would have made. The value of a prevented birth is then given as the present 
value of an infant's expected stream of consumption and production. That rate 
of discount which makes the present value zero is the rate of return on invest-
ment in birth prevention. Alternatively, if we use as the rate of discount 
the market rate of return for alternative investments, then a negative present 
value for the birth implies that it would pay society to bribe the potential 
parents not to have children, up to the point where the present value goes to 
zero. 
The cost-benefit calculation can be laid out as follows: 
t B -C L P (1) t (l+r) 
where P is the cost of preventing a birth through the family planning programme, 
is the consumption saved in year t by having prevented the birth (the amount 
the person would consume in year t), and C+ the contribution to output in year t 
that is lost. This is conveniently divided up into three time spans: 
144 60 t=65 
B + V + C 1 B^ >_ P (2) 
C ^ - k < 
t=o(l+r)t t-15 (l+r)t t=61>Q+r)t 
This assumes that the person is a 'pure consumer' for the first 14 years of his 
life, has a working life from age 15 to 60, and enjoys a retirement period, again 
as a pure consumer, to age 65. If a 15 per cent pate of discount is selected 
(r=0.15), as done by Enke, the present values of the last two flows are negligible. 
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and the value is determined almost entirely by the first term comprising 
consumption expenditure as a child (both expenditure by the parents and social 
expenditures). Since by his estimate P is also negligible, of the order of 
one dollar, there is an overwhelming advantage in preventing the birth. It 
is worth noting, in anticipation of our discussion of this aspect later on, 
that with P = $1 the cost of the family planning programme itself is almost 
inevitably negligible in equation (2) compared to the values of B^, and r, 
and indeed is not significantly different from P=0. 
The calculation can be helpfully illustrated as in Fig.l, taken 
from Liebenstein.(9) Here it is assumed that the consumption saved is 
constant each year at 100 units, and production also constant at 40 for the 
period of working life. A logarithmic scale is used for the simplicity of 
Fig. 1. Present Value of a Prevented Birthf 
working with straight lines. • The vertical distances are all present values 
and these diminish at a steady rate, 100 units of consumption being worth 
progressively less the further away in time it is. The line for production 
foregone would, if extrapolated, hit the Y - axis at the 40 level. 
The sum of benefits, measured in present value, is given by the area 
under the line B^, and that for costs by the area under the line C^. As the 
diagram is drawn, the former are clearly dominant. One reason for this is, of 
course, that the line C^ lies well below B^ throughout. This reflects a 
particular assumption made by Liebenstein, that the extra person born will add 
to production an amount equal to the marginal product per period, whereas he will, 
as an equal member of the family which he joins, be able to consume an equal 
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share of consumption equivalent to the average product per household. The 
diagram implies a marginal product equal to 40 per cent of the average. This 
is a reasonable assumption for a country with a serious problem of population 
pressure such as India, and proponents of the disguised unemployment thesis 
might equate it to zero. It is useful to drop this assumption both for 
illustrative purposes, to focus on the second reason for the dominance of 
benefits, and also to move away from the 'Asian' model of an overpopulated 
developing country and to turn to the African situation where in many cases 
land is not a constraint on production and constant returns in agriculture 
can be assumed. 
With constant returns we should have marginal product equal to the 
average (though both, in Africa, at a low level) and the B^ and lines 
would then coincide over the middle range. In fact it would make sense to 
draw the line C^ above since the average product of an adult can be 
assumed to be capable of sustaining the adult himself and of providing some 
amount for dependents, in exactly the same way as he was sustained in his 
first 15 years by the production of adults. 
This is done in Fig. 2 which focuses attention on the main reason 
for Enke's result, the pure saving on consumption over the first 15 years and 
the relative importance, given discounting, of these first years. Benefits 
were clearly dominant over costs in Fig. 1, which was drawn up on the 
assumption of a rate of discount of only 4 per cent. At this rate of discount, 
had C_,_ lain well above B , the result would not have been certain. Since t t 
Enke considers the appropriate rate of discount to be something around 15 per 
cent, however, we could draw much steeper B and C lines as in Fig. 2 (not 
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precisely drawn to scale). In this diagram all costs after the fortieth year, 
for example, discount to zero, Here the production of an adult is given as 
160 units (measured by the intercept of on the Y - axis: later 160's are 
worth less in present value terms) compared to consumption of 100. A working 
adult would thus produce a 'spare' 60 units each period with which to support 
dependents. Because of discounting, clearly, net benefits in the first 15 
years easily outweigh net costs in later periods. 
This second diagram is more relevant to the African situation or 
generally to areas where currently there is no excess population involving 
high densities and land shortages. It is useful in taking some account of 
the long run position in that it assumes a prevented birth will mean not only 
some released consumption during the next 15 years but also the loss of an 
able - bodied man (or woman) in the longer period who would have been able 
to produce a surplus capable of supporting some dependents in exactly the 
same way as present adults are doing. 
Criticisms Relating to the Maximand 
Having laid out the theory in the most exposed form possible, we 
can turn to some criticisms, first, relating to the maximand. One potentially 
major omission is any account of the value of children to parents. The 
objective function in Enke's analysis is taken to be simply "to maximize over 
time the G.N.P. per head of the existing population". This is equivalent to 
viewing all future additions to population as slaves. Alternatively, to use 
Liebenstein's amusing allusion, the sum is the same as that for an animal farm 
in which the farmer calculates a cow's production and consumption streams 
in deciding how many cows he should have,. To be worth while, a child must 
make a net addition to G.N.P. available to the present population. 
As several observers have pointed out, the family might be quite 
ready to accept a decrease in their own consumption per head in favour of the 
extra member. We can view the latter not just as a producer good but as a, 
consumer good, yielding services in the form of his own welcome company as a 
member of the family, services for which the family might be prepared to 
sacrifice other forms of consumption. If no externalities were involved this 
substitution would be an entirely private matter, and the net cost would be 
zero. If, on the other hand, there were externalities, the net benefit to 
society from preventing the birth would need to be calculated net of a bonus 
payment to the family concerned sufficient to provide full compensation, which 
payment could be very large indeed. 
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Liebenstein's criticism of the argument is rather different. 
(9, also see 5, 6 and 10.) The difficulty, he says, is the lack of a social 
welfare function. Neglect of the value of children to parents is in the 
first place inconsistent with the welfare criterion that an action is 
desirable 'if someone gains and no-one loses1.. Consider a completely 
self-sufficient subsistence farming family having a third child, If the 
same aggregate consumption is now shared among five rather than four, no one 
outside the family need lose from the decision: if the household prefers the 
additional child to the extra consumption there will be a net gain. However 
to make a cost-benefit calculation here would, he says; require a social 
welfare function "which includes children as well as consumer goods". But 
"no-one knows the appropriate substitutability between children and 
consumption goods since children are not bought and sold, and do not have 
monetary values". All valuations must therefore be in utilities, he asserts. 
(9, p.117) Liebenstein does not, however, elaborate this point, and is not 
at all clear on it. It is in fact quite difficult to handle. Two aspects 
must be kept distinct: the separation of private and social costs and 
benefits, on the one hand, and the actual calculation of overall costs and 
benefits on the other. In the appendix we discuss how this might be 
calculated if a thoroughgoing system of bonus payments were in operation, 
but conclude that the problem of defining a social welfare function remains. 
If, as a result of a purely informative campaign, a number of 
parents decide to prevent births, it can be deduced that the psychic income 
foregone from these births is less than the private net cost of the prevented 
births; and the likelihood is that a fair proportion will actually be un-
desired births for which psychic income is small, zero or even negative. 
Enke's calculations might be justified in respect of family planning programmes 
which are purely informative and aim at preventing largely unwanted1 births. 
Clearly it is important that the analysis distinguish between wanted and un-
wanted births, and between passive, informative campaigns and strongly 
persuasive ones, using bonus payments or even compulsory methods such as 
compulsory postponement of marriage: but this is a_distinction which Enke 
does not clearly make. 
Enke does later agree that the psychic value of children to parents, 
measured in money terms, should have been taken into account. (5) He is not 
obviously aware, however, of the big difference this might make to the 
calculation. Nor is this incorporated into his later work with TEMPO, which 
he claims avoids some of the simplifications of his earlier pioneering efforts. 
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In fact this factor could completely alter equation (2) (See Appendix 1.) and 
the illustrative diagram, since these are birth prevention costs which occur 
especially, though not exclusively, in the first fifteen years, and are not 
eliminated by discounting,. This point is a very elementary one, and it will 
be obvious even to laymen that a balance needs to be made between the possible 
utility from expanded families and the internal and external costs. It is 
nevertheless neglected not only by Enke, but by Ohlin in his survey of 
population economics.(12) From the point of view of private costs and 
benefits, the balance of values of B and C^ after the first fifteen years 
may be more important, utilities and costs in the first period balancing out. 
Since there will be public costs particularly in the first years, this will 
not necessarily hold true for the social rate of return, where the discounting 
factor and dominance of the first period may be crucial: but here only 
external benefits from birth prevention (EB^, where B^PB tEB^) would be 
counted, assuming private benefits and costs balance out. 
We should certainly expect on a priori grounds that a sixth or 
seventh child is not likely to bring the same utility to parents as the first; 
and this itself suggests that in general the psychic value to parents of 
children should not be omitted from the cost-benefit calculation. There .is 
evidence from fertility studies that the percentage of parents not wishing 
to increase their families increases with family size, as indicated in Table 2 
below. 
Table 2. Percentage of Parents not Wanting more Children, 
Country No. of children 
3 4 5 or more 
Ceylon 57 69 88 
Thailand 71 85 96 
Turkey 68 67 76 
Philippines 56 68 85 
Tunisia 68 87 
Brazil 95 93 93 
Costa Rica 67 78 86 
United States 62 81 74 
Source: (l), reproduced in (12). 
Data on ideal family size as stated in response to direct questions on the 
issue show in a great many countries (not Kenya) an average ideal of three 
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or four children, this also suggesting the existence of diminishing marginal 
utility. In addition, those taking more serious birth control measures, such 
as fathers offering themselves for vasectomies, are especially those with a 
large number of children. If therefore the utility derived from an additional 
birth varies within one family according to the number of children, it would 
seem difficult to omit parental utility from the calculation. 
A second major conceptual difficulty, related to the above, is that 
the ex post utility derived from a birth may differ entirely from ex ante 
utility: even babies which parents have tried (and failed) to avoid are 
generally welcomed and offer the same satisfaction after the event. This implies 
that the value of a prevented birth may differ from the 'cost' of an unprevented 
birth. We may nevertheless ignore this complication with some justification 
on grounds that "what you don't have, you don't miss". 
Enke's calculation excludes, thirdly, the utility foregone by the 
prevented births themselves. It is, of course, rather inconsistent to calculate 
the utility enjoyed by existing people whose births could have been prevented, 
and not those whose births actually are prevented. This is also inconsistent 
with practice elsewhere in economic analysis where it is generally accepted 
that the social rate of discount applied by the government should reflect also 
the interests of future generations (unlike the private discount rate), that 
is, of those who are not yet born. What is eliminated for prevented births is 
not only the consumption goods enjoyed by them, which are released for others, 
but even the capacity to consume: the value of life itself. This raises a 
measurability problem of a quite different order. Welfare economists have been 
willing to attempt to attach monetary values to life, for instance in relation 
to road investments and road accidents, but only in relation to the living, not 
the unborn. At the same time there is some justification in deciding to ignore 
this element, though this would be contested by Catholics. 
Criticisms Associated with the Discounting Procedure 
As indicated above, the fantastically high rates of return obtained 
stem from the fact that the birth yields only costs for the first 15 years, 
together with the operation of discounting on this. The effect of discounting 
is very powerful. For instance, a 15 per cent discount rate reduces income 
earned at age 30 to a present value of one per cent. The entire future 
production of an Indian baby is reduced to only $17 in the present*(16) This 
is a rather suspicious result. It means that the released consumption from 
1. Such data is reviewed by A. Molnos (11)
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the prevented birth is the only matter of consequence, and that reduction by 
one in the future workforce is in every case unimportant. It means that the 
value of the prevented birth is the same for a family's first child as for 
its seventh (a consequence erf 'omitting direct parental utility). It means 
that the same high rate of return to birth prevention must have applied 
the existing population as well as to new births produced by this population. 
And it means that, since there is nothing in the analysis to cause the marginal 
efficiency of investment in birth prevention to decline, all investment funds 
should be allocated to family planning programmes. 
• .f ' i 
Such implications have been commented on by other observers. Simon 
points out that on Enke's argument income per head would probably be maximised 
in the next 15 years if no babies were born in that period, but that "this 
would have a cataclysmic effect starting in perhaps 25 to 30 years as the 
ratio of the labour force to dependents began to fall towards zero "»(16, 
p.63) If, on the other hand, a low rate of discount were taken, to give due 
weight to the utilities of future generations, Enke's reasoning "immediately 
falls to the ground on its own internal logic", since new babies could now have 
a positive net value. A question is raised, therefore, regarding the optimum 
policy spanning several generations, that is, which takes into account long 
run consequences. 
Liebenstein attempts to demonstrate the same kind of apparently 
peculiar result of the discounting procedure. In Fig 3 he considers a 
Fig. 3. A situation in which birth control reduces per capita income. 
stationary population which is at an 'optimum' in the sense of maximum income 
per head at P*. He assumes further that additions to capital stock, while 
shifting upwards the income per head function, does not alter the size of the 
optimum population from P*. Birth control would obviously reduce income per 
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head below the maximum level. Yet the Enke type of calculation would still 
indicate such a reduction in population as desirable: since all it requires 
is that, while each person consumes what he produces over his lifetime, 
consumption precedes production. To a considerable extent, Liebenstein 
concludes, the benefits exceed the costs because of the discounting procedure 
employed. 
He does not however solve the apparent inconsistency. This may lie 
in the fact that the picture is timeless and represents a static long run 
equilibrium in which the full long run effect of population control is felt 
on the size of the workforce; while at the same time no short run or growth 
aspect is involved. This would be all right if short term changes led back 
2 
eventually to this long run position. However the figure abstracts from the 
dependency ratio; whereas restriction of population in the short run would 
lower the dependency ratio and thus increase savings and investment. This 
would result in a more rapid move from curve K^ to curves K^ and K^, and so 
on. Rather than the shifts of the curves being entirely exogenously determined, 
the speed of movement would depend on birth rate reduction. The optimum path 
might be something like AB, which takes into account both savings - investment 
effects and longer run effects on the size of the workforce, and would 
depend in part on the returns from investment (-shifting the curve upwards). 
There is no bias towards the present generation, and the objective function 
might maximise the income per head of any one generation, or the area below AB, 
spanning several generations. 
If we do not discount future generations out of the picture, we can 
take account of the compounding effect of birth control on the numbers of 
women-at-risk, and thus future births. It is another uneasy result of Enke's 
method that this element is lost. Suppose we have an agricultural island 
economy, such as Mauritius', in which the available land may be adequate for 
the present population and a bit more. If the population were increasing at 
a current rate of 3 per cent per annum, doubling itself every 25 years, it 
must be worth taking action now: and because of the compounding effect from 
generation to generation. This is in fact the standard population problem of 
increasing numbers and limited resources, which is ignored in Enke's short 
run analysis: Malthus is irrelevant.' It may be proper to ignore this problem 
if investment is forthcoming in sufficient amount and at a sufficiently high 
2. This inconsistency is doubly unfortunate in that Enke points out 
another in a previous illustration of Liebenstein's in which he posits in-
consistently a zero marginal rate of return on capital and a positive rate 
of time preference. 
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rate of return to expand incomes continuously:which may hold for newly 
industrialising nations which have 'taken off' , but not for all less developed 
countries. 
Enke describes elsewhere the external effects of large families 
as being due to the fact that the prolific families will not stay on their 
own subsistence holdings, but that young men will go off "to compete as industrial 
workers and indirectly for the use of other factors of production". Simon 
points out the inconsistency here, since by his own reasoning no public cost 
would be involved, in present value terms, if "not many heads of government 
look beyond 15 years". Apart from this inconsistency, however, the significant 
thing is that Enke diverts attention to the private versus social cost aspect, 
and away from the problem of reconciling short and long term aspects. 
Figure 3 is useful in illustrating in an elementary way the inter-
action of these two aspects of the problem. It gives an insight, moreover, 
into the fundamentals of the macroeconomic population models which we shall 
be examining presently. 
A second crucial assumption of Enke's, apart from the general 
formulation, is the actual social rate of discount selected. It is of course, 
a matter of general debate what the appropriate social rate of discount might 
be in the typical less developed country. If we look briefly at the basis 
of discounting, we can say that governments should not exhibit 'pure' time 
preference: they should weigh equally the welfare of present and future 
generations. If income per head in the future is expected to be higher than 
the present level, as is likely, this would, on the other hand, justify private 
and governmental discounting on grounds of diminishing marginal utility of 
income. And, most important, if present income or consumption can be exchanged, 
through investment, for a larger future income, then present income will be 
worth more by an amount equal to the marginal rate of return on investment. 
If we leave out of consideration all except the last of these, then 
the social rate of discount to be used will be the marginal rate of return 
on investment, that is, the rate of return on projects competitive to the one 
at hand. Enke argues that the rate of return on projects in less developed 
countries can be observed to be of the order of 10 to 15 per cent, and would 
need to be as high to divert capital from just as profitable investment 
alternatives in the developed countries. (5) Accordingly he considers a 15 
per cent rate of discount to be justified. 
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This leads us to appreciate a crucial element in his theory the 
full significance of which has not been made clear by either Enke or his 
critics. The same element is an integral part of the later macroeconomic 
models of Enke and those of others. The dominance of the early period in 
his cost-benefit analysis depends on a high rate of discount, which can only 
be due to the high marginal rate or return on capital assumed, not to time 
preference resulting from increasing incomes. Thus although the presentation 
is static, the analysis is essentially dynamic: population control reduces 
the ratio of dependents to workers, and 'releases consumption' to provide 
savings for investment. The high present value of a prevented birth thus 
reflects the high rate of return on investment assumed. Thus the rate of 
return on birth control turns out to be only a proxy for the rate of return 
on other investments. Thus the choice is not between investment in other 
projects, hut between consumption on the one hand and birth prevention plus 
investment in other projects on the other. This is clear from Figure 3, 
which shows the optimum path to depend on the long—run productivity of labour 
and on the immediate returns to investment. 
Unfortunately, Enke's assumption may not be justified. It 
would imply firstly, that capital is the only bottleneck in developing 
countries, a view no longer widely supported, and secondly that there 
are unlimited opportunities for investment at the existing rate. Much 
more likely is an investment function of the form given in Figure 4. 
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Fig. The marginal rate of return on investment with limited investment 
opportunities. 
This depicts a situation in which there exist at any one time a definite 
number of feasible investment projects yielding very good rates of return 
in a developing country (the curve shifting to the right over time as 
investment opportunities are developed) after which the marginal rate of 
3 
return drops sharply: a mineral economy would be an extreme example, but 
usefully represents the investment situation in many less developed countries. 
If there were unlimited opportunities to invest in less developed countries 
at a rate of 15 per cent per annum, these countries would not remain very 
long underdeveloped, and the lives of development bank and other officials 
looking for good projects in which to invest would be very different from 
what they obviously are. Enke would appear to be confusing the average 
and marginal rates of return. 
3. A 3 per cent rate is not so low if we take into account a 
discount for riskiness, as we ought: 3 per cent would be an average on 
marginal projects some of which will fail and some of which will yield 
more. 
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Looking at Fig. released consumption might permit investment 
either in projects within the range OA carrying rates of return of 10 to 
15 per cent or projects outside this range carrying only a 3 per cent rate. 
This has a number of implications. To the extent that Enke's 'staggering 
rates of return' to family planning expenditures depend on a 15 per cent 
discount rate, this would apply only so long as investment possibilities 
were in the range OA. Beyond this a 3 per cent rate would apply, and the 
future output of a prevented birth would not be discounted to zero.- An out-
put of $200 at age 25 would have a present value of $100, and compare 
favourably with consumption at age 0. The long run would once again be 
important: it would no longer be necessarily rational to invest all 
resources in family planning: only that amount sufficient to release the 
amount of consumption/savings which can be invested at the high rate, and 
to the extent that these funds cannot be cheaply obtained elsewhere. 
Criticisms Relating to the Response Factor and the Cost of Preventing a 
Birth 
We can turn now to the last element in Enke's cost-benefit equation, 
the cost of preventing a birth, P. The cost-benefit approach estimates this 
by a simple but mechanical rule-of-thumb in an example given by Ohlin "the 
insertion of an I.U.D. will cost approximately $2 per person and the 
average I.U.D. will stay in place for approximately two years (at a cost 
of $1 p. a.) and since the ratio of women in the child bearing ages to the 
number of children born per year is approximately 5 to 1, the cost of a 
prevented birth is about $5". The resulting value for P is so small as to 
be negligible in relation to the rest of the equation. This seems to 
imply that the only cost is that of supplying devices to a queue of waiting 
women or of providing facilities for sterilisation to satisfy the demands 
of those desiring operations. It entirely ignores the publicity costs and 
the costs of persuading recipients to accept birth control measures. 
In fact if strong resistance to birth control exists in the area, the 
costs could be very high, even reaching infinity, if no one can be persuaded. 
In fact very little is known about the costs of administering 
family planning programmes. According to Liebenstein, estimates vary 
"from a low of about $24- in Taiwan to something over $7,000 per birth 
prevented". (9, p. 166) Robinson also points out that very few efforts 
have been made to calculate costs of actual programmes. (14) In contrast 
with an Enke estimate for I.U.D,'s of $1.11 per birth prevented, he 
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quotes one detailed cost estimate in Taichung, Taiwan, made in 1963, of 
$6.48 per I.U.D. inserted, or roughly $25-30 per birth prevented: and 
in a country with unusually favourable conditions for a family planning 
programme. 
There are a number of practical difficulties in making any 
estimate of the results of a family planning programme. Acceptance of a 
particular contraception method under the programme may represent only 
a 'substitution effect', recipients merely substituting this for other 
birth control measures already in use. 'Folk' methods of birth control 
such as withdrawal are historically very important and are still in 
widespread use. In the China - periphery countries such as Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore, abortion and infanticide have been practised on a 
wide scale, and the substitution effect here is likely to be substantial. 
There may also be compensating effects, such as a simultaneous reduction 
in the age of marriage, essentially another form of substitution. 
Similarly there may be 'switching' as between private channels of 
contraceptive assistance to the government programme, though equally 
there may be a 'spin-off' from programme publicity persuading parents 
to adopt control measures outside the programme. Finally there is 
considerable uncertainty regarding continuation rates. Table 3 gives first 
method continuation rates for selected countries. The mean rates after 
Table 3. First method continuation rates for selected countries. 
I.U.D. Acceptors Pill Acceptors 
continuation rates continuation rates 
12 months 24 months 12 months 24 months 
Korea 57 38 26 -
Singapore 69 - 56 -
Taiwan 67 54 - -
Mauritius 68 - 53 -
Hong Kong 66 49 58 -
Thailand 76 56 71 -
Bangla Desh 74 66 - -
Pakistan (West) 56 - 62 47 
W. Malaysia 68 52 35 -
Ceylon 81 69 56 -
Philippines 70 55 60 38 
India 77 54 32 — 
Mean 69 55 51 43 
Source: (15). 
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two years are given as 55 per cent and 4-3 per cent for I.U.D. and pill 
respectively. These figures are not, of course, too acurate, but the 
order of magnitude is indicated. This factor alone could dwarf the costs 
of I.U.D. insertion as calculated by Enke, since it indicates that 
parents may only postpone the birth one or two years rather than 
prevent it: the saving might then be only one or two years' consumption, 
and not fifteen, depending on the effect on ultimate family size. The 
above are, of course, only first-method continuation rates, and couples 
initiated under the programme may switch to other methods. But it is clear 
that it is not enough to measure programme success by numbers of pills 
distributed or I.U.D.'s inserted: there may be little relation between the 
cost of acceptance of contraception and the cost of a net birth prevented. 
There are, therefore, a great many difficulties in assessing 
what the actual cost of preventing a birth has been in a specific programme 
and specific location. 
It is even more difficult to estimate what the response would 
be, and thus the costs per prevented birth, in a greatly expanded 
programme or in new locations and countries. 
We can however make two suggestions regarding responses, which 
appear plausible. First it seems reasonable to hypothesise some sort of 
'response function' for family planning acceptance in any particular 
area. A programme will most likely tap first couples with least 
resistance to adopting birth control (including those already using 
some form of contraception and substituting the recommended method) but 
could find it progressively more difficult and eventually almost impossible 
to find new recruits. The situation might be as described in Fig. 5, 
which gives the cost per prevented birth as a rising function of the 
number of births prevented. This shows three phases: phase I, with a 
very low cost, referring to couples looking for assistance, and to 
unwanted babies; phase II to couples reluctant but capable of being 
persuaded to adopt birth control, but at a higher cost in terms of 
publicity; and phase III, comprising a fairly solid wall of resistors. 
The second point, somewhat in contradiction to the idea of a 
defined response function, is that most births are not caused or prevented 
according to a calculation of cost and benefit, but through a much less 
18 IDS/DP 222 
Fig. 5. A possible response function for family planning programmes 
rational process. Two pieces of evidence from Britain may be cited 
in support of this. The clear downward trend in the birth rate was 
temporarily interrupted in 19 58 as a result of a scare regarding the 
possible side-effects of the pill. In the winter of 1974, following the 
coalminers' strike, the government ignored warnings which proved to have 
substance, about the effects on the birth rate of early - evening closure 
of television programmes with the aim of saving electricity. This 
evidence suggests that the category of unwanted or not positively 
wanted babies may be quite wide and that the scope for persuasion may 
also be greater, persuasion aimed not at preventing desired births 
but at taking of proper steps to avoid non-desired births. Such persuasion 
would include making birth control facilities accessible as widely as 
possible. How important this category is in any particular situation, 
of course, still needs to be discovered and could vary widely. 
Enke shows very little awareness of the problem of response. 
He states, for example, that his estimates "assume participants volunteer 
without expensive propaganda campaigns". In addition he calculates 
resource costs for eight different birth control methodsjail, except for 
the pill, very small, and then proceeds to work out cost-effectiveness 
ratios for each of them, finds these to vary "by a factor of 250 times 
between the most and the least costly", and hence says "the choice of a 
method to stress is important". (3, p. 50) If it is true, as Liebenstein 
says, that: 
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On the cost of birth prevention, the low cost of devices 
(condoms, pills, I.U.D.'s) are5 of course, a trivial 
aspect of the problem. It is the 'non—device' costs —• 
communication, administration, and the cost of overcoming 
psychological resistances - that can range all over the 
map. (9, p. 119) 
then Enke's exercise has no meaning. It does not indicate the relative 
value of withdrawal and the pill, for instance, as alternative methods. 
Ohlin is more circumspect on this point, and makes modifications 
to cover administrative overheads and publicity costs, but in the end 
arrives at not very different figures; altogether only $5-10 per prevented 
birth is required for "an effective population policy". He argues that 
"it is difficult to undertake any calculation of the economic gains that 
might be realized from population control which does not point to very 
spectacular benefits". (12, p. 120) Simon considers the response factor 
explicitly, but discards it: 
Persuasion campaigns do require real resources for salaries, 
printing, radios, etc. But even expenditures many times any 
conceivable sum for persuasion would not use up enough resources 
to make the withdrawal from other investment of any importance. 
For example, the Indian Institute of Management prepared what 
they considered a very ambitious mass advertising plan. The 
budget recommended is $2.4 million, which 'would be the largest 
promotional campaign /of any kind/, by far, even carried out 
in India'. • Even a budget ten times that large would amount 
to only 5c. money cost per head. In fact persuasion costs may not 
even be much larger than the costs of contraceptive devices 
and operations. And much of the money costs of promotion are 
not real social costs. Incremental advertising is produced at 
very low marginal cost in newspapers and radio. All this argues 
that one can safely disregard the effects of resource expenditures 
for birth reduction on investment when calculating the value of 
prevented births. (15, p. 68 ) 
Ohlin cites data from fertility studies of desired family size in support of 
his position. Thus Table 2 above shows that parents who already have 
four or more children generally do not wish to increase their family 
further. The fact that percentages are very similar in all countries 
regardless of nationality, race and religion is significant. This 
includes even the Catholic countries of Latin America. 
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These data appear very persuasive until one puts alongside 
them direct evidence of response to actual programmes and campaigns. 
While desired family size shows considerable uniformity, actual trends 
in birth rate and actual responses to campaigns vary considerably. 
Consider, for instance, the differential response observed in different 
Indian states. The 1.9 per cent total acceptance rate for India, for 
I.U.D.'s and sterilisation together, has been observed to hide "a great 
diversity of achievement". (8, p. 4-5) The I.U.D. target achievement in 
1969-70 varied from 6-7 per cent in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh to 69 
per cent in Punjab, and 92 per cent in Haryana. Sterilisation target 
achievements varied from 17 per cent in Assam to 80 per cent in Orissa. 
In part of course, such variation in response may be due to avoidable 
variation in efficiency of campaign organisation or commitment by local 
governments. 
What the discrepancy between evidence of desired family size 
and actual response to programmes would indicate is that the element of 
non-planning in family increase is considerable. This does not necessarily 
mean that the proportion of unwanted births is equally great or that a 
high degree of responsiveness exists over the full range of unplanned 
births. Much more evidence is required, covering a variety of countries 
and situations, regarding the response function, and the relation of 
unplanned births to it. 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT APPROACH TO REDUCING THE BIRTH RATE 
Some population specialists have argued that major success in 
family planning cannot come before demographic modernisation: fundamental 
changes in attitudes towards desired family size. And this will in 
turn depend on such factors as health, social conditions, the degree of 
urbanisation, literacy, education and especially the provision of 
education and employment opportunities for women, all associated with 
economic development. This economic development approach is contrasted 
with the family planning approach: it argues that population control efforts 
can succeed only through changing desired family size, and that for this 
socio-economic change is a prerequisite. 
Raulet, for example, recognising the downward demographic 
trend in Taiwan, South Korea, and other China-periphery countries, 
suggests that "the minor role of family planning programme in this total 
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process does have important Implications for population policy", claiming 
that "there is no empirical evidence so far that demographic modernization, 
even with the aid of family planning programmes, moves far ahead of other 
aspects of modernization". (3) Robinson also asserts that the successes 
have generally been in countries which have already made substantial socio-
economic progress, death rates are typically low, female literacy high (50 
per cent or more), urbanisation is advanced, and there is already some pre-
programme decline in fertility. (14) Bondestam, in a study of Kenya, takes 
the same position. (2) 
High-death rates may indirectly affect the birth rate in two 
ways. Where there is a high loss of children through infant mortality the 
tendency will be to insure against this by having larger families, and 
resistance to birth control will be strong. Secondly, it may be the 
case that longer life expectancy for adults will reduce fatalistic 
attitudes, giving them a new desire to cojitrol their destiny and to 
defend the family's income per head. Assessment of the precise importance 
of this factor does, however, require much more careful statistical analysis 
than has been the case so far. 
Despite our earlier suggestion that a low desired family size 
does not itself guarantee a successful family planning programme or a 
uniform positive response, the socio-economic position is probably the major 
determinant of the shape and nature of the response function. Since this will 
determine the rate of return to family planning expenditures, this rate of 
return is likely to vary considerably between favourable and unfavourable 
countries, just as between different phases within one country. Robinson 
does indeed classify high fertility developing countries intolithree groups. The 
first, into which he puts several Latin American countries including Mexico 
and Chile, are those which have already made "substantial strides towards 
development". The second group shows some modernisation, though the bulk of 
the population is as yet untouched by change: family planning clinics, in the 
urban areas only, are likely to be successful. The third group are countries 
"at the beginning of their development where prospects for family planning are 
poor". In fact acceptance of family planning may well depend on too many 
complex factors to permit such a facile classification, as information I have 
collected in Kenya certainly indicates: the aspect which should be stressed 
is the considerable variability of conditions with respect to acceptance rates 
among different countries. 
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If we take into account the above points - the existence of a 
response function, the importance of non-planned births, and the 
dependence of these on the socio-economic situation - the need for, more 
empirical evidence is clear. Enke's and Ohlin's estimates may be valid 
for some 'phase I' relating especially to unwanted births and to 
particularly receptive parents. The rates of return they calculate may 
be realistic for this group, without being valid for unlimited extension 
of a national programme or for indefinite decreases in birth rates. 
THE MACROECONOMIC APPROACH TO EVALUATING POPULATION CONTROL 
An apparently very different approach to assessing the impact of 
population measures is to build a dynamic macroeconomic projection model 
in which the population factor interacts with a number of economic 
variables. Savings, investment, health and productivity, technological 
change and employment levels in different economic sectors may all be 
made to depend on population growth rates. The method consists of making 
several alternative projections of output per head for different birth 
rates, and assessing the benefits of population control only as part of 
a general macroeconomic exercise. Projections are generally made to 
span several decades up to about 30 years. The classic study in this 
area was published by Coale and Hoover in 1958 for India, covering the 
period 1956-86. Table 4 shows that a number of other such exercises 
have been attempted. The figures compare per capita income under declining 
fertility and under constant fertility for various time periods. This is 
the approach followed by Enke in his more recent contributions. 
Table 4-. Comparison of population/economic growth models. 
Percentage ratio of per capita income 
of declining fertility case to high 
Model Country fertility, case after: 
10 years 20 years 30 years 
Coale and Hoover India 103 113-116 138-148 
Hoover and Perlman Pakistan 114-120 
Ruprecht Philippines 104-105 117-132 135-193 
Newman and Allen Nicaragua 105 115 125 
Enke, 1967, 1967, General 109 119 129 
Enke, AID/TEMPO 15 years 
General 111 
Source: Ruprecht, (15), Table II.1 
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This more sophisticated approach, which may be considered to 
represent the current wisdom on the subject, is less vulnerable to 
criticism partly because some of the cruder assumptions of the cost-
benefit approach are avoided, and partly because the assumptions made are 
more heavily disguised. As in the cost-benefit analysis, the effect of 
birth rate reduction on the dependency ratio is in all cases crucial: 
but the effects of this on savings and investment are now built into a 
full model. Simon summarises the Coale-Hoover model by saying that: 
Their basic observation, from which most of 
their results flow, is that the birth rate has 
a great effect on the age composition of the 
society, and upon the proportion of people in the 
labour, force. Children do not enter the labour 
force for a long time after birth, and no model 
that does not embody this truth can be superior 
to Coale and Hoover's work. (16, pp. 66-7) 
The results also show a very high return to population control. Simon, 
employing the Coale-Hoover model, says: 
Enke estimated an expenditure of 10 cents per head 
to be a hundred times as productive as other 
investment; by our estimate they are perhaps 
forty times as productive - and much more so at a 
lower rate of discount. (16) 
One difference, as the table demonstrates, is that the economic 
impact is shown to be a long-run rather than short-run phenomenon. The 
effect is increasingly important after 15-20 years. This is because the 
models are dynamic: in addition to compounding the effect of reduced 
births on further births in a later period, the investment of savings 
arising out of released consumption also has a compound interest effect 
on national output. Unlike the static approach of Enke, it is_ possible to 
take into account the Malthusian effect of increasing numbers of women-at-
risk, so that more births now mean even more births later. Indeed the 
models are based on the twin compounding effects of investment in output 
(in the numerator), on the one hand, and of a reduced number of heads 
(in the denominator): the latter compared to the number which would 
have existed at non-reduced fertility rates. 
The models are, however, open to criticism. In the first place 
too little is known at present about the relevant functional relationships 
for any very satisfactory model of developing - country economic growth 
to be built. There is uncertainty regarding the determinants of saving, 
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regarding supply responses to multiplier effects on the demand side, 
regarding the determinants of technical progress, and especially regarding 
the extent of investment opportunities. Enke himself points to serious 
deficiencies in the construction of his first model, TEMPO I, which he 
says "could not have been more aggregative. There were no sectors, such 
as rural and urban, modern and traditional, domestic and international, or 
private and public" (7) 
Secondly the benefits of a prevented birth depend essentially 
on the uses to which savings can be put and in part on the existence 
of an efficient government which can make use of funds. The rate of 
return on birth prevention expenditures remains a proxy for the rate of 
return on available investment opportunities. In the case of oil 
economies, this could be the return on funds invested in London and other 
financial centres. Against this the models do not depend on a very high 
discount rate, as does Enke's analysis: a lower rate of discount in the Coale-
Hoover model gives a higher value for each prevented birth. 
The models also make a major unstated assumption regarding the 
amount of released consumption. There are two kinds of released consumptions 
from a prevented birth: private, obtained within the family, and 
released public consumption. The former may turn out to be illusory if the 
family expands its consumption by the equivalent amount: while this may 
represent a net benefit to the family over the 'value' of the child, it is 
not saved and therefore cannot contribute to the compounding effect on 
which the model is built. One of the criticisms of the Lewis model of 
development with unlimited supplies of labour, and of the disguised 
unemployment thesis in general, is that when a migrant moves to the 
modern sector there may be no savings, since those remaining in the 
rural area will expand their consumption in this way. If this applies 
in respect of an adult migrant, it will most certainly be the case that 
the potential private consumption of a prevented birth will be taken 
over by other children or by adults. 
The models say nothing about the utility derived by parents from 
children, or about the potential utility of the prevented births themselves. 
4. In Simon's calculation, based on Coale-Hoover, present value is 
$114 at 15 per cent and $222 at 5 per cent rate of discount. 
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They are not cast in utility terms at all, in ways that might draw 
attention to these omissions or assumptions. The calculations are in 
fact based on comparing total output and total number of heads at various 
dates in the future, to derive income per head. The utility which is 
maximised, therefore, is that of those who are actually born. The 
calculation would again have held true in respect of the births of a very 
substantial proportion of current members of the population. The only 
limit to the severity of the population control programme is in fact 
the possibility of increasing average product of labour (due to relative 
abundance of other factors or economies of scale), and it is not evident 
that this is a potentially effective constraint in the models as 
constructed. 
This constraint is incorporated in Fig. 3, our static diagram 
which we said includes the essential elements of the dynamic models. 
The figure indicates the theoretical possibility of the effect of the 
reduction in the work force (movement to the left exceeding the effect 
of reinvestment of savings (shifting thercrcrpveupwards). Without reviewing 
in detail the various models, any assumption about the relation-
ship between the size of the labour force and average productivity is likely 
to be one of diminishing returns, reflecting some assumed population 
pressure on the land. It would be interesting to compare an African 
model assuming constant returns and an elastic supply of land: this would 
focus directly on the balance between pure consumption savings over the 
first 15 years and net output losses after that time. 
Despite the various qualifications above, rates of return 
from successful birth prevention are likely to be high simply because the 
amount of released consumption spanning a period of 15 years must 
represent a considerable volume of savings and even at a 3 per cent rate 
of return must yield substantial output when compounded over such a 
period. The models, however, say very little about the response factor. 
They simply project the effects of different hypothesised fertility rates: 
they do not discuss the possibilities of achieving these rates in any 
actual country, or the costs of achieving them, which might be infinity. 
Coale and Hoover, for instance, ignored costs on the grounds that 
contraceptive advice would be given through established welfare facilities 
already part of the government programme. The appropriate conclusion 
may be only that high returns are available from limited programmes 
involving information campaigns and the provision of assistance to those 
who already want the service or who are producing unwanted births. 
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Enke does, in his 1974 model, incorporate an assumption regarding 
the response factor. The cost of- creating acceptor demand is supposed to 
increase " linearly' from $0 at 15 per cent acceptance rate to $40 per 
acceptor at 50 per cent acceptance among eligible women. He thus posits 
a response function of similar form, implicitly, to Fig. 5. The empirical 
basis of his specific function is not well established, however, and the 
goal of 50 per cent of eligible women (or their spouses) by 1999, after 25 
years, constitutes a very high target. Since $32 of the $40 is transfer 
payment due to bonus incentives, his response function also raises again the 
question of negative family allowances, 
Less work has been d©ft"<§ in Africa regarding the response factor 
and the possibilities of achieving any given reduction in the rate of 
population increase than in any other continent. In a later paper some 
evidence regarding response to family planning programmes in Kenya will 
be considered, 
' APPENDIX 1: COMPLICATIONS RAISED BY THE VALUE OF CHILDREN TO PARENTS 
If a system of bonus payments were in operation, as envisaged 
by Enke and others, a measure of the anticipated utility derived by 
parents from an additional child would in principle be obtainable. 
Parents' decisions to prevent a birth will depend on their calculation of 
private costs and benefits. Let us assume the government is willing to 
make a bonus payment for a prevented birth: this is the equivalent of 
a tax on a birth which is not prevented, so we may talk about a birth 
tax and, for negative values, a birth subsidy. The lifetime consumption 
of a birth may be divided into that which is privately provided and that 
which is publicly provided. The cost of a birth to parentst will thus 
equal the net private consumption of the birth (we can refer here to 
PC and PBt) plus the birth tax (bonus payment foregone)TS and this will 
be set against the lifetime utility derived, U , also put into present 
. - 5 value terms. Thus parenrs will be induced to prevent a birth only If 
5. PC is the loss of output which would have accrued to the 
family, that Is9 total lifetime output less taxes. 
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ZPBt - PCt + T >_ (1 + r)* U l + r)t (1) 
which may be written more briefly as 
NPB + T >_ U (2) 
where NPB is the net private benefit from birth prevention. 
Suppose there is a purely informative family planning campaign 
which simply informs people of the means of preventing births and of the 
costs and benefits involved. For some parents, we shall have U > NPB, 
so that the campaign is not effective: these births would only be 
prevented if a bonus is offered. In principle there is for each family 
some value of T, T^, which is just enough to induce them to prevent the 
birth, such that 
NPB + T m = U (3) 
This gives us a monetary measure for U. For other parents we shall have 
U < NPB, so that the purely informative campaign _is_ effective in preventing 
births. The campaign here will bring a social gain, therefore, but the 
question is how to measure this. In principle, there is some minimum 
birth subsidy which would make each of this group of parents willing not 
to prevent the birth, that is, for which-
U + S = 'NPB (4) m 
which would measure U as 
U = NPB - S (5) m 
Though i NPB is straightforwardly estimated, or at least as easy to estimate 
as the original Enke formula, the problem is that any bonus actually 
paid will be a uniform one, and intramarginal parents will have different 
S 's or T 's.6 m m 
6. Payment of bonuses would thus involve a transfer payment: this 
would not affect our cost-benefit calculation, but could be an undesirable 
side effect. 
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The bonuses described here probably have little to do with 
bonuses actually paid to date for sterilisation in India, for example. 
These payments have been small and perhaps more of value as publicity 
rather than serious inducements to offset positive anticipated utility 
from unborn children. If a system of realistic bonuses were in operation, 
it might be possible to estimate U for marginal families induced to 
prevent births, by varying the level of bonuses: but the nature of a 
family planning programme is such that it starts from a position where 
families lack complete knowledge of their substitution possibilities, and 
lack a fully defined preference map as required by (3). Because of this 
it would be necessary to have independent estimates of utility values: 
which bring us back to Liebenstein's problem. 
A further conceptual problem arises where the publicity for a 
family planning programme aims through persuasion, rather than information 
to alter desired family size: and there is probably no programme in 
existence which does not try to do this. Since parents' preference 
functions themselves are altered, welfare comparisons are not strictly 
valid. 
We should note, again, that realistic bonus payments, while they 
might be useful as a means of estimating utilities, are in effect 
negative family allowances, and are undesirable from the point of view 
of income distribution. 
I.- -
The difficulties in estimating parents' utility from unborn 
children are therefore that present bonus payments, where they exist, 
have been only nominal publicity payments; realistic payments are 
socially undesirable. To the extent that family planning programmes 
attempt to improve knowledge, about means of contraception and private 
benefits therefroma they deal with preference maps which are incompletely 
specified; and to the extent that they use strong persuasion they are 
changing preference functions. Finally, there is the problem mentioned 
earlier where the ex post utility to parents differs from the ex 
ante value. 
APPENDIX 2: THE CASE FOR BONUS PAYMENTS 
The issue of bonus payments or birth taxes may arise in 
relation to either of two questions. If the birth is socially undesirable 
taking into account total benefits and costs both inside and outside 
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the family, should the society bribe the parents to prevent the birth? 
Secondly, there is the equity issue: if there are net private benefits 
from the birth, but external costs, should the parents be taxed up to the 
value of the external costs they impose? 
In the former case it will make sense for society to bribe 
parents up to the value of net social benefit from birth prevention 
(or to spend the equivalent amount in persuasion costs), and for parents 
to accept a bribe up to the value of net private benefit from the birth. 
Births would be prevented where net social benefits from prevention 
exceed net private benefits from non-prevention. In the second case, 
the object is not birth prevention but redistribution of the costs of 
the birth. The birth tax would be fixed at the level of external costs. 
Births might however be prevented incidentally in cases where the net 
private benefits from the birth are less than the birth tax (equal to 
external costs). 
It is obviously essential to keep these two issues conceptually 
separate, whereas Enke appears sometimes to run the two together. 
However, neither he nor his critics, Liebenstein and Simon, while 
debating a number of equity considerations in population control, point 
out that bonus payments or birth taxes of either type are intrinsically 
un'desirable. This is because bonus payments to parents of smaller 
families are in effect negative family allowances affecting the consumption 
not just of the parents but of the children who are not party to the 
decision. 
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